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Unintended consequences: Theatre deregulation
and opera in France, 1864–1878
KATHARINE ELLIS
Abstract: The French legislation of 6 January 1864 which deregulated spoken and lyric
theatre nationwide showed little sensitivity to the distinctive ﬁnancial ecology of regional
theatre. Its effects were precisely the opposite of those its architects intended, and caused
most disruption to the very constituencies the legislation was intended to help. Comparative
analysis of the immediate aftermath of this ‘liberte´ des the´aˆtres’ reveals a state of near chaos
across France. Town councils oscillated between abandoning to the market their traditions of
theatre as artistic social service, and pouring in yet more taxpayers’ money just to maintain
the status quo. Opera, as the most expensive art form, was the immediate casualty, ceding
considerable ground to a vigorous entertainment sector based around the operetta repertory
(including ope´ra-bouffe) and the cafe´-concert chanson.
The story goes that after decades of lobbying from playwrights, composers, pro-
fessional associations and publishers, the 1864 legislation deregulating the French
stage was eventually catalysed by Napole´on III’s personal experience.1 This, at
least, is how Marseille’s readers of the weekly news-sheet La Publicite´ would have
understood it if they had read the ‘Liberte´ des the´aˆtres’ anecdote it published on
7 January – the day after the law was passed.2 The scene takes place in the far
south-west. Visiting Biarritz, the emperor is appalled to ﬁnd the theatre – that
key provider of educational entertainment – closed. The mayor explains that the
company licensed to serve the area is playing elsewhere, and that Biarritz’s two-
month turn will come around again in the winter. The emperor’s follow-up ques-
tion is logical, though perhaps startlingly uninformed: why can’t other companies
use the theatre in the meantime? And so we read of how the mayor of Biarritz
apparently described to his emperor how French theatre managers were licensed
by the state, in contract with town councils, to run their companies as business
monopolies in major urban centres, in secondary towns grouped into deﬁned
areas (arrondissements), or as travelling companies serving even smaller communities;
and how the licences for resident company managers traditionally offered them the
territorial right either to stiﬂe competition by keeping their own venues closed out
1 This essay is a complement to two others: ‘Systems Failure in Operatic Paris: The Acid Test of
the The´aˆtre-Lyrique’, in Music, Theater, and Cultural Transfer : Paris, 1830–1914, ed. Mark Everist
and Annegret Fauser (Chicago, 2009), 49–71; and ‘Funding Opera in Regional France:
Ideologies of the Mid-Nineteenth Century’, in Art and Ideology in European Opera, ed. Clive
Brown, David Cooper and Rachel Cowgill (Woodbridge, 2010), 67–84. Its research was aided
by an AHRC Small Grant in the Creative and Performing Arts and a British Academy Research
Development Award. I am also grateful to the British Academy and to the Research Committee
of Royal Holloway, University of London, for funding my attendance at the American
Musicological Society Annual Meeting, Washington 2006, where I shared this work in its ﬁrst
incarnation.
2 La Publicite´: revue immobilie`re, industrielle, commerciale, critique et the´aˆtrale, 9, no. 369 (7 January 1864), [2].
of season, or to tax competitors by taking a cut from their ticket revenues as they
passed through town. (Presumably he did not dwell on the fact that the system
was, in essence, the creation of the emperor’s uncle, Napole´on I.3) The anecdote
follows Napole´on III back to Paris, where he fumes at the idea that private indi-
viduals could deprive his provincial subjects of theatre for most of the year, and
not only demands a deregulation bill but rejects the ﬁrst draft as too conservative.
What is needed, he says, is a liberalising measure that simply renders theatre ‘an
industry like any other’, with managers operating in open competition.4
Whatever the veracity or otherwise of its detail, this account points to a paradox
at the heart of the 1860s deregulation story: although it may have been sparked by
an experience that involved regional France, its effectiveness was fatally under-
mined by misunderstanding of regional difference and regional complexity. For
the tale implies that the Emperor of France made three assumptions: that the
challenges of providing theatre in a smallish town served part-time by a local
company – a troupe d’arrondissement – were identical to those in metropolitan centres
where a resident company served more than one theatre; that a single law would
work in Paris and the regions alike; and, implicitly, that the current system of
town-council subsidies was unnecessary. If those were indeed his views (assuming
he thought that far), he was misguided in ways that merit our attention. For when
national legislation fails locally, as happened here, one can learn a great deal: about
common but usually unremarked practices; about expectations and aspirations;
about relationships within and between regions; and, in the case of France, about
centralist/decentralist tensions. When such failed legislation is well-meaning and
seems to respond to public demand, one arguably learns even more; and the
Second Empire’s ‘liberte´ des the´aˆtres’ did indeed enjoy enthusiastic support. In
this article, which concentrates on major metropolitan centres with resident com-
panies – in other words, those that could stretch to grand opera – I analyse how
what was, broadly speaking, a privatisation law, clamoured for in the capital but
viewed with more circumspection in the regions, helped change the map of theat-
rical France in unintended, unwanted and largely uncontrollable ways.5
The allure of ‘liberte´’
Napole´on III’s legislation was long-awaited, prepared following national consulta-
tion, and (according to those who actually drafted it) intended to inject France
with artistic vitality by removing longstanding obstacles to theatrical expansion.
Audiences were to beneﬁt from a proliferation of good theatre, and artists eager
to cement their careers with success in Paris sensed the arrival of opportunities
3 For an insight into the Napoleonic system in force from 1806 (repealing the ‘liberte´’ of 1791),
see Howard Bould, ‘The Lyric Theatre in Provincial France (1789–1914)’, Ph.D. diss. (Univer-
sity of Hull, 2005), 61–71.
4 ‘une industrie comme une autre’. La Publicite´, 9, no. 369 (7 January 1864), [2].
5 On debates prior to the ‘liberte´’, see my ‘Funding Grand Opera’. For an analysis of its effects in
smaller towns working the arrondissement system, see Romuald Fe´ret, ‘Le de´cret du 6 janvier
1864: la liberte´ des the´aˆtres ou l’afﬁrmation d’une politique culturelle municipale’, in Les
Spectacles sous le Second Empire, ed. Jean-Claude Yon (Paris, 2010), 51–60.
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they had long been denied under a system so rigidly compartmentalised, genre by
genre, that it hindered both opportunity and experiment.6 Now, with the exception
of the national ﬂagships in Paris – the Ope´ra, the Ope´ra-Comique and the The´aˆtre-
Lyrique – France’s theatres were to be run essentially as private enterprises. New
venues could be built and operated with a minimum of ofﬁcial intervention (mainly
involving censorship), and they could each put on a variety of genres, including
experimental ones. From idealist, centralist and Parisian perspectives the legisla-
tion offered everything: a catalyst to creativity, an end to the repressive mono-
polies that bedevilled regional theatre provision, and the opening up of new per-
forming spaces for classic and popular masterpieces some of which had hitherto
been cooped up in national theatres where they took up space that could be given
over to living artists. What could possibly go wrong?
Admittedly, the prospects for the regions looked less immediately rosy, but that
was in part because they were almost all in a ﬁnancially parlous state. Municipal
theatre managers had long considered bankruptcy an occupational hazard, and
across the country and the century large numbers of them terminated their con-
tracts just before the bailiffs arrived. The costs of grand opera in particular were
now breaking the back of even the largest regional companies, and the genre was
far beyond the capacities of their smaller, travelling cousins, for which vaudeville
was the most complex musical genre they could usually mount. Opera seasons
had begun to shrink as early as the late 1840s as a way of saving money, leaving
many orchestral musicians with lean weeks either side of the summer spa season.
Meanwhile, in the interests of social justice town councils routinely speciﬁed the
ticket prices their contracted theatre managers could charge in each section of the
theatre, and in the interests of their members’ livings composer and author unions
raised their royalty rates. Regional managers had to pay the Poor Tax out of their
takings, too – usually around 10 per cent and to be paid irrespective of whether
they broke even. Even with subsidies, which rose inexorably from the 1830s
onwards, they struggled to balance the books. This was the side of the often
strained town council/theatre manager relationship on which La Publicite´ ’s anec-
dote did not elaborate: the fact that although theatre managers enjoyed and some-
times abused monopoly rights, they were all too frequently reduced to begging the
council for bailouts. Something had to change.
Support for liberalising measures was fuelled considerably by widespread suspi-
cion of those vestiges of ‘feudalism’ and ‘privilege’ embodied in the role of the
municipal ‘Directeur des the´aˆtres’. The middle of the century is replete with tales
of licensed managers restricting access and muzzling competition, not only, as
in Biarritz, by effecting temporary closures during a company’s absence, but, in
larger centres, by refusing on purely economic grounds to run all the theatre
6 First, there were not enough theatres for them in Paris, and second, those theatres could
present only their contractually allotted genres (which meant those genres were effectively pre-
deﬁned). Even with the advent of the much more ﬂexible The´aˆtre-Lyrique in 1851, the supply
of young opera composers outstripped the capacity or willingness of the capital’s theatre
managers to stage their works. It was hardly a recipe for innovation. See my ‘Systems Failure’,
passim, and ‘Funding Grand Opera’, 68.
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buildings they controlled.7 And this despite the notion that theatre was a right and
not a pleasure. In other respects, consumer power prevailed in ways which prob-
ably encouraged indirect support for deregulation because they focused on the
‘them’ and ‘us’ relationship created by the manager’s privileged position. While
the passive protest of staying away from the theatre was open to everyone, the
only moment at which audiences could actively and collectively inﬂuence artistic
standards was via the annual public auditions for principals – ‘de´buts’ – with
which the manager accountable to his local audience was duty bound to start the
season. Ticket holders were, after all, indirectly paying his council subsidy via their
taxes, as well as directly via the box ofﬁce. Those with season tickets had even more
cause. Here was their opportunity to hold their licensed manager to account, and
they took full advantage of it with shouting, whistling and occasionally missile-
throwing. Precisely because such evenings could become riotous, pre´fets, who
represented the State at regional levels, and commentators mindful of their town’s
national image, tended to favour abolishing the de´buts system. For very different
(selﬁsh) reasons, the vast majority of theatre managers would have voted the same
way.8 Mayors, who needed to demonstrate accountability to their tax-paying resi-
dents, tended instead to favour reforming the existing system.9 Among journalists
and pamphleteers a general (and erroneous) assumption existed that a ‘liberte´ des
the´aˆtres’ would make ‘de´buts’ redundant because it would sever the link between
privilege and accountability.10 This, too, seemed a good reason to support it.
7 The most famous manager of the period, Olivier Halanzier-Dufrenoy, was especially energetic
in neutralising competition, both in Rouen in 1860 and (with less success) in Marseille six years
later. Arch. De´pt Seine-Maritime, 4 T 99 (Rouen) and Arch. Mun. Marseille 77 R 37. See also
the battle of 1862–3 between Biche-Latour, manager at the Grand-The´aˆtre in Bordeaux (who
sought to establish a cafe´-concert as a complementary business), and Martial Le´glise, director of
the well-established Alcazar cafe´-concert on the other side of the river (Arch. De´pt Gironde
167 T 14, folder Correspondance 1863). From 1859 to 1864 successive directors of the The´aˆtre
Graslin in Nantes successfully blocked the running of the The´aˆtre des Varie´te´s, despite the
building being privately owned (Arch. De´pt. Loire-Atlantique 177 T 8).
8 Halanzier was an exception: for him the de´buts season was a cornerstone of his business plan
because it was so popular that ticket revenues gave him a ﬁnancial buffer for the rest of the
season. See his open letter of 27 August 1863 printed in the Se´maphore de Marseille the following
day (36, no. 10,900 (28 August 1863), [2]). Halanzier’s case compares usefully with that of
Raphae¨l Fe´lix, brother of the tragic actress Rachel, whose disastrous tenure at Lyon ended in
riots in September 1865 after he persuaded the pre´fet and the council to abolish the require-
ment for ‘de´buts’ on the basis of both the 1864 legislation and the new designation of the Lyon
theatre as ‘Impe´rial’. He saw this priceless new title as indicating that Lyon should now take its
cues from Paris, where different traditions prevailed. See Archives Municipales, Lyon,
88 WP 006 (folder 20). On Lyon more generally, see Malincha Gersin, ‘Les Spectacles a` Lyon
sous le Second Empire: stabilisation locale et de´bat national sur les ‘‘de´buts’’ ’, in Les spectacles
sous le Second Empire, ed. Jean-Claude Yon (Paris, 2010), 290–302. Gersin sees widespread
‘stabilisation’, in the form of downsizing of various kinds, as characteristic of regional provision,
but does not link the acceleration of such downsizing to the perverse effects of a ‘liberte´’
promulgated to do precisely the opposite.
9 The mayors usually won: in various guises, regional de´buts survived the legislation by at least
ﬁfty years in most of the major French towns, often being voted on by secret committee ballot
rather than by an entire audience.
10 Discussed at length by A. Lomon in La France musicale, 26/1 (5 January 1862), 2–3.
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Proposals for reform in the guise of pamphlets, articles and petitions landed
on the desk of the Ministre des Beaux-Arts regularly during the ﬁrst half of the
century, resulting in two abortive attempts at new legislation in 1848–9 and 1853 –
the latter speciﬁcally targeted at the problems the regions faced.11 The process
began again with a similar ministerial consultation document of 8 September 1862
from the comte Alexandre Colonna-Walewski, Ministre d’E´tat et des Beaux-Arts,
asking regional representatives for diagnoses of the problems and advice on how
best to proceed, but dwelling especially on the public order problems of the existing
‘de´buts’ system.12 This time there was a following wind: a major press campaign
in favour of liberalisation doubtless helped demonstrate the extent of support
for a reform Napole´on III apparently desired, and Walewski showed considerable
determination to ensure the draft legislation’s successful progress, even though
during 1863 the theatre’s portfolio passed out of his hands and into those of the
mare´chal Vaillant at the Maison de l’Empereur, and even though there was resis-
tance to the new law among civil servants.13
The devil in the detail
When the law was ﬁnally passed in 1864, it made no distinction between Paris and
the rest of the country. Therein lay its fatal ﬂaw, for from a regional perspective
there was indeed plenty to go wrong. Anyone with knowledge of the complex
ﬁnancial ecology of regional theatre would have recognised that onto an already
deﬁcit-ridden system it imposed extra costs that someone – entrepreneurs, muni-
cipalities, consumers or a combination thereof – would have to bear. In short,
Napole´on III’s overturning of the repressive theatre system instituted by Napole´on
I did not facilitate artistic expansion, grandeur or originality in the newly liberated
private sector; it did precisely the opposite both in Paris and the regions. As my
closing example will illustrate, its consequences were decisive in freeing up a
commercial entertainment sector whose drive and popularity left the legislation’s
intended beneﬁciaries – spoken theatre and opera – in considerable difﬁculty.
Indeed the unexpected reversal of opera’s fortune in favour of opera-bouffe, operetta
and music-hall chanson was such that one theatre manager quipped despairingly
that it should have been called the ‘liberte´ des cafe´s-concerts’.14 Central to the
11 A good sample of such pamphlets is collected in Archives Nationales (henceforth AN) F21 954
and 955.
12 By far the most detailed response was unofﬁcial: the Rouennais Antoine-Louis Malliot’s La
musique au the´aˆtre (Paris, 1863), which responded clause by clause to the consultation document,
recommending continued opera subsidy, expanded educational opportunity, and state funding
for regional theatres. On Malliot, see my ‘Funding Grand Opera’, 80–3.
13 Albert Delpit, ‘La liberte´ des the´aˆtres’, Revue des deux mondes (1 February 1898), 601–23, at 602.
Delpit names Camille Doucet, then overseeing theatre regulation at the Maison de l’Empe´reur,
as ﬁghting courageously against the legislation, but he is most likely mistaken. It was Charles
Blanc, Directeur des Beaux-Arts, who is reported in 1864 as having opposed it (anonymous
mention in Le Messager des the´aˆtres, 2/92 (29 January 1849)).
14 Report of 5 December 1878 from Ch. Pottier, manager of the Grand-The´aˆtre in Bordeaux, on
the consequences of the liberte´. Arch. De´pt. Gironde 167 T 15. Despite the obvious beneﬁts
footnote continued on next page
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legislation’s failure across France was the one-size, regions-blind nature of its text.
And yet for other reasons – mostly to do with the belated timing of its arrival – it
failed in Paris too.
Signed by mare´chal Vaillant, and in accordance with Napole´on III’s apparent
wishes, the legislation’s opening article read that as of 1 July, any person of
acceptable moral standing could, having made a declaration to the authorities,
build or manage a theatre at their own risk. At a stroke, this sentence seemed to
sweep away all monopolies, contracts and privileges together with the limitations
on venues and repertory that went with them. While it did not mean that all
repertory was openly available (censorship remained in place, the national theatres
had to adhere to their allotted genres, and author and publisher permissions were
still required before recent works could be staged), the theatre world’s feudalism
and its enforced compression in an environment of urban expansion were at an
end. Moreover, and despite the pervasive rhetoric of theatre as art and education
in government and journalistic documents alike, the legislation indirectly recognised
that French theatre was a competitive industry that could and should operate
as independently of government restriction as possible. Hence the emphasis on
‘liberte´’.
Deregulation was warmly welcomed in the capital as an end to privilege, repres-
sion, and an outdated system of royal or imperial patronage. In the regions, too,
and especially among those wishing to starve opera in order to regenerate good
drama, it commanded strong support.15 And the very word ‘liberte´’ appeared
intoxicating.16 Nevertheless, the legislation did not enforce and was not intended
to imply an entirely free market. In a dilution of the long-standing requirement
(dating from an Ordonnance of 8 December 1824) that municipal councils with
resident companies should support them ﬁnancially, Vaillant mitigated the impact
of the opening sentence with the suggestion that: ‘Theatres that appear especially
worthy of encouragement may be subsidised, either by the State or by com-
munes’.17 As worded, this sentence contained neither a recommendation nor a
requirement: it simply outlined the existence of a legitimate exception to the
norm. Vaillant’s introduction to the decree as published in the Moniteur universel
offered a partial gloss: such theatres would be models, raising artistic standards
within the new legislative framework. There was, however, no further detail.
Once again Paris and the regions were treated as one; moreover there was no
acknowledgement that adequate subsidy was precisely what town councils were
of using nuanced generic terminology to identify the various forms of light opera, for the
remainder of this essay I follow the majority of 1860s and 1870s commentators and simply use
the term ‘operetta’ (ope´rette).
15 See my ‘Funding Grand Opera’, 71–7.
16 One Toulousain supporter signed off his theatres review in blind faith: ‘On this question as on
all others, let’s trust fearlessly in Liberty’s beneﬁcial inspiration.’ [Sur cette question comme sur
toutes les autres, conﬁons-nous sans crainte au soufﬂe bienfaisant de la Liberte´.] ‘E. V.’ of the
Revue de Toulouse et du Midi de la France, vol. 19 (1864/1) [February 1864], 153–8, at 158.
17 ‘Les the´aˆtres qui paraıˆtront particulie`rement dignes d’encouragement pourront eˆtre subven-
tionne´s soit par l’E´tat, soit par les communes.’ Decree of 6 January 1864. Article 1, paragraph 2,
given in Le Moniteur universel (7 January 1864), n.p.
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currently struggling to provide. Finally, there was no hint as to whether monies
might now ﬂow outwards from Paris, with the State supplementing municipal
support. In August, when Vaillant spoke about the legislation at the Paris Conser-
vatoire’s annual prize-giving ceremony, addressing musicians and actors together,
he revealed a still narrower vision, applauding its potential to support artistic ex-
pansion and regeneration in spoken theatre alone:
In abolishing privileges and monopolies, in giving to all theatres the right once reserved
exclusively to the Come´die-Franc¸aise and the Ode´on, to mount freely the masterpieces
of the old repertory, the new legislation was aimed at elevating French artistic and literary
standards still further.18
In practice, the ‘subsidy clause’ allowed the national theatres in Paris to pursue
business as usual, their managers working to a contract in return for state funding.
And it was intended to suggest the same to the mayors of town councils as they
and their colleagues pondered the appropriate response to the new Paris legisla-
tion. Yet it did not – or at least, not consistently – which meant that Vaillant had
belatedly to make his meaning explicit in a circular of 28 April 1864 to pre´fets in
which he wrote, unconvincingly, that he was trying to ‘foresee the difﬁculties
which implementation of the decree of 6 January last might raise’, and in which
he enjoined the pre´fet of each De´partement – governmental supervisors to the
country’s mayors – to ensure that town councils not only maintained subsidies,
but added new ones.19 Even as it broadcast ‘liberty’, then, the legislation created
a potential division between regulated and deregulated areas of theatrical activity,
and outside Paris the boundaries were left for individual councils to decide. The
result was a period of chaotic experimentation, with U-turns aplenty leading to
short-termism and planning blight. The results, duly inherited by the Third Re-
public, left the reformist Age´nor Bardoux, Ministre des Beaux-Arts, preparing to
redraft the legislation yet again in 1878, in the face of demonstrable failure in the
capital and (as he discovered in light of regional consultation) worse consequences
everywhere else.
The free market/public subsidy division sparked impassioned debate, even
within constituencies one might expect to show solidarity. The most immediately
affected were the professional associations that supported authors – playwrights
and composers alike. In responses that provided an uncanny mirror of Vaillant’s
(and Napole´on III’s) lack of understanding of regional pressures, the Socie´te´ des
Compositeurs drafted complaints to the Senate about the unfair competition
which the subsidised sector, meaning the Paris ﬂagship theatres, represented for
those out in the cold:
18 ‘En supprimant les privile`ges et les monopoles, en donnant a` tous les the´aˆtres le droit
exclusivement re´serve´ nague`re a` la Come´die-Franc¸aise et a` l’Ode´on, de repre´senter librement
les chefs-d’œuvre de l’ancien re´pertoire, la le´gislation nouvelle a voulu encore e´lever en France
le niveau artistique et litte´raire.’ Speech of 4 August 1864, cited in Constant Pierre, Le
Conservatoire national de musique et de de´clamation (Paris, 1900), 965.
19 ‘pre´voir les difﬁculte´s que pourrait soulever l’application du De´cret du 6 Janvier dernier’.
The new circular was widely published in the press and is also conserved in AN: F21 1330
‘Circulaires’.
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In effect how can one hope, realistically, to establish free ventures, in competition with
those which are so generously subsidised? [. . .] It is a formal abrogation of the true eco-
nomic principles of commercial equality, of free competition. . . [. . .] By subsidising a
single businessman, you instantly destroy all other ventures in the same area.20
On the other hand, Jules Ruelle, editor of the Messager des the´aˆtres and a staunch
supporter of the legislation on behalf of the royalty collection societies his paper
represented, gladly inferred from the legislation’s text that for the regions full
municipal underwriting – re´gie – would become the default guarantor of artistic
standards, with each council owning its opera house, paying a full staff, maintain-
ing its own wardrobe and scenery store, and engaging a salaried administrative
manager instead of contracting with an entrepreneur.21 Everything depended on
where one wished to ﬁnd the legislation’s point of balance between competition
and protection – and for whom.22 In short, the law had been badly drafted. Inter-
pretations of its text, its implications and its strengths and weaknesses, were to
vary wildly. Vaillant’s initiative of 28 April was a vain shutting of the stable door.
Consequences
Disruption was prolonged, for in raising the question of subsidy by mentioning it
as optional within an act of deregulation the legislation had problematised it anew.
This was as true in the capital as elsewhere. In 1866 Gustave Bertrand argued, as
part of an extended essay on how to fund the Ope´ra and the Ope´ra-Comique,
that not all ‘industries’ were equal, and that in this regard theatre was comparable
to artisanal concerns such as the Gobelins tapestry workshops and the Se`vres
porcelain factories, which still beneﬁted from government money. He found the
alternative unacceptable:
I cannot imagine the complete abdication of the state [i.e. subsidy] without seeing art
venturing into an ocean full of reefs and strong currents, doubtless never destroyed, but
frequently brought low, suffering extensive damage. Certain genres would surely perish,
and they would be the noblest and loftiest ones. Everything would tend towards making
itself small or medium-sized, the better to accommodate the needs of general taste.23
20 ‘Comment espe´rer en effet, qu’il puisse se fonder se´rieusement des exploitations libres, en
concurrence avec celles qui sont si ge´ne´reusement subventionne´es? . . . – C’est une de´rogation
formelle aux ve´ritables principes e´conomiques de l’e´galite´ commerciale, de la libre concurrence,
re´cemment consacre´e, meˆme pour nos relations avec l’e´tranger, par les derniers traite´s de
commerce. – Subventionner isole´ment un industriel quelconque, a` l’instant vous annihilierez
toutes les autres exploitations de la meˆme industrie.’ Draft letter of 1864 or early 1865 to
Senate: Arch. de la Socie´te´ des Compositeurs de Musique (Bibliothe`que Nationale de France,
Musique, Re´s. 995).
21 Le Messager des the´aˆtres, 17/4 (14 January 1864), [3]; and (more explicitly), 17/7 (24 January 1864), [1].
22 With the beneﬁt of some fourteen years of hindsight, Age´nor Bardoux’s consultation document
of 1878 in preparation for new legislation would make explicit that he sought to support three
distinct interests: art, the public and artists (AN F21 1330 ‘Circulaires’). The 1864 legislation
demonstrated no recognition that these interests might exist, still less that they might conﬂict,
and in different ways in different parts of the country.
23 ‘[ J]e ne puis penser a` l’abdication comple`te de l’E´tat, sans apercevoir l’art aventure´ dans un
oce´an plein d’e´cueils et de courants inconnus, jamais de´truit, sans doute, mais souvent ravale´,
footnote continued on next page
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Such embourgeoisement – recalibration of the monumental to a domestic scale – was
anathema to him, as indeed it was to other supporters of subsidy, who invariably
adopted a version of Vaillant’s ‘model theatres’ argument. National disaster, how-
ever, made downsizing a distinct possibility given the ﬁnancial exigencies of
defeat by Prussia. In the early Third Republic, when disparagement of Second
Empire frivolity was at its height and when one might assume the state anxious
to preserve the highest standards at its model theatres come what may, subsidy
for the Paris ﬂagships had to be defended vigorously. In 1873, for instance,
L’Art musical reported the annual discussions at the Commission des The´aˆtres:
There was animated discussion about abolishing the subsidy to the Ope´ra-Comique.
It is truly regrettable that the subsidy accorded to our national theatre should be
challenged year on year. It seems to us that given the invasion of operetta, which is the
scourge of music, it would be more logical to increase the Ope´ra-Comique’s subsidy than
to abandon it.24
Beyond questions of national pride, the background to such debates was that for
those who expected operatic regeneration, the medium-term Parisian experience
of deregulation was harsh. No new private venture succeeded in creating and
retaining a new audience for opera or in providing the new operatic opportunities
the legislation seemed to offer to living composers. In addition, deregulation
could not stem the tide of public opinion in favour of operetta and the cafe´-
concert. Bertrand, for instance, would surely have felt both depressed at and
vindicated by the Parisian operatic map during the Exposition Universelle year of
1867, which saw Offenbach’s ope´ras-bouffes occupy three deregulated Paris stages
while new large-scale opera was available on subsidised ones only.25 It must also
have been galling for French opera composers to see that the monumental new
work the Ope´ra staged during the Exposition was by an Italian, albeit with French
librettists (Verdi’s Don Carlos), while during the same period the unmissable musical
comedy was by a German (Offenbach’s La Grande-Duchesse de Ge´rolstein). But to
make matters worse for opera professionals, cafe´-concert legislation was progres-
sively breached after 1864 and liberalised under the theatres administrator Camille
Doucet on 31 March 1867. With costumes and props now ofﬁcially sanctioned,
these popular entertainments came ever closer to sung theatre while remaining
resolutely entertainment-centred.26 They seemed, in other words, to represent
sujet a` des avaries sans nombre. Certains genres pe´riraient assure´ment, et ce seraient les plus
nobles et les plus releve´s. Tout tendrait a` se faire petit ou moyen, pour mieux s’accommoder
aux besoins du gouˆt ge´ne´ral.’ Gustave Bertrand, ‘E´tudes d’e´conomie the´aˆtrale. Les the´aˆtres
lyriques de Paris, I’, Revue moderne, 36/1–2 (1 January–1 February 1866), 93–105; vol. 37/2
(1 May 1866), 299–318, at 102.
24 ‘La suppression de la subvention de l’Ope´ra-Comique a e´te´ vivement discute´e. Il est vraiment
regrettable que tous les ans le subside accorde´ a` notre the´aˆtre national soit remis en question.
Il nous semble qu’en pre´sence de l’envahissement du genre ope´rette, qui est un ﬂe´au pour
la musique, il serait plus logique d’augmenter la subvention de l’Ope´ra-Comique que de la
supprimer.’ L’Art musical, 12/50 (11 December 1873), 397–8. Unsigned.
25 Orphe´e aux Enfers (Bouffes-Parisiennes), La Vie parisienne (Palais-Royal), La Grande-Duchesse de
Ge´rolstein (Varie´te´s). For more detail on Paris, see my ‘Systems Failure in Operatic Paris’, 64–9.
26 F. W. J. Hemmings, Theatre and State in France, 1760–1905 (Cambridge, 1994), 202.
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the best of both worlds: theatre without didactic intent or artistic stufﬁness, and
comprising everything from the noble or gracious sentiments of the aria to the
raciest double-entendre of chanson lyrics that could be got through the censors’
ofﬁce. Belatedly, what composers and opera critics saw as the consequences
of deregulation in Paris was the squeezing out of ‘independent’ opera between
cushioned but generically restrictive national theatres on the one hand and a
dynamic entertainment sector on the other.
But what of the regions? It is worth turning back to L’Art musical, a publisher’s
journal which, like Jules Ruelle’s Messager des the´aˆtres, backed deregulation to the
hilt. On 28 April 1864 – the very day of Vaillant’s attempt to shut the stable
door – its readers would have found the following front-page editorial.
Every coin has a reverse: there is no excellent measure which does not at ﬁrst present
dangers, inconveniences . . . We were among the ﬁrst to congratulate ourselves on the
salutary and providential initiative taken by the emperor on the subject of theatrical
deregulation, the ﬁrst to applaud sincerely, unreservedly, an idea of such liberalism which,
rendering all citizens equal in the face of art, abolished at a single stroke the alien custom
of licences and monopolies, incompatible with our age . . .
But can this symphony of praise remain unanimous if, in leaving the capital for a while
we start to examine the fate – already sad and discouraging – of our departmental stages,
notably the operatic ones . . . without wishing for a moment to cast blame on the new
measure, we shall try to indicate brieﬂy how it might become injurious to the art if
signiﬁcant intervention does not come soon to mitigate its effects.27
This was neither an over-reaction nor the misreading of a blip as a sign of long-
term difﬁculty. Almost a year later even the ofﬁcial line as presented to members
of the Chambre des De´pute´s in February 1865, in the Expose´ de la situation de
l’Empire, read like an exercise in the lowering of expectation:
If, in the De´partements, the theatrical situation has worsened somewhat, it is because
there, especially, a complete transformation was necessary and because the 5 [6] January
decree can only with time produce the positive results that the Administration has every
right to hope for.28
27 ‘Il n’est pas de me´daille sans revers; il n’est pas d’excellente mesure qui ne pre´sente au prime-
d’abord quelques dangers, quelques inconve´nients . . . Nous avons e´te´ des premiers a` nous
fe´liciter de la salutaire et providentielle initiative prise par l’Empereur au sujet de la liberte´ des
the´aˆtres, des premiers a` applaudir since`rement, sans restriction, a` une ide´e aussi libe´rale, qui,
faisant tous les citoyens e´gaux devant l’art, abolissait d’un seul coup l’e´trange coutume des
privile`ges et des monopoles, incompatible avec notre e´poque . . . Mais ce concert de louanges
pourrait-il eˆtre aussi unanime si, en quittant un moment la capitale, on se prenait a` examiner le
sort de´ja` de`s a` pre´sent assez triste et de´courageant des sce`nes de´partementales, notamment des
sce`nes lyriques . . . Nous le croyons pas; et sans essayer un seul moment de blaˆmer la nouvelle
mesure, nous taˆcherons d’indiquer brie`vement en quoi elle pourrait eˆtre nuisible a` l’art, si une
puissante intervention ne venait a` la mitiger par son application.’ ‘RALPH’ ( pavillon neutre used
by Le´on Escudier, Mark de The´mines/Achille de Lauzie`res and Gustave Chouquet) in L’art
musical, 4/22 (28 April 1864), 169.
28 ‘Si, dans les de´partements, la situation des the´aˆtres a rec¸u quelque atteinte, c’est que, la` surtout,
une transformation comple`te e´tait ne´cessaire et que le de´cret du 5 janvier ne peut produire
qu’avec le temps les heureux re´sultats que l’administration est en droit d’en espe´rer.’ Cited in
Pierre Bossuet, Histoire des the´aˆtres nationaux (Paris, 1909), 482.
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In early 1864 the most immediately serious problem was twofold. First, incum-
bent regional managers were either resigning or demanding enhanced terms that
would ﬁll the funding gap the government had just created by abolishing their
right to tax competitors. Second, councils in major operatic centres were adhering
to the letter of the legislation’s ‘subsidy’ clause rather than to its spirit. And while
I have found no hint that any council with a resident company discussed the
logical free-market extreme of selling off its municipal theatre buildings, sacking
its permanent staff and casting its theatrical responsibilities to the winds, sub-
committees were routinely reconsidering subsidy policies ab initio, and councils
were not all making the Paris-approved decision. These latter events, rather than
the personal stories of resignation and ﬁnancial brinkmanship, were what reached
the papers ﬁrst, helping spread a sense of panic. As reported with horror by
‘RALPH’, by March 1864 the councils of two contrasting theatrical towns –
Marseille and Le Havre – had already interpreted the legislation as indicating that
a free market should reign. They had abolished their subsidies, with the result that
no grand opera company could be hired for the 1864–5 season.29 The manager of
all three of Le Havre’s theatres from 1859, the seasoned Franc¸ois-Jules Juclier,
had responded to the ‘liberte´’ legislation by expressing the wish to run just the
two secondary theatres, the Varie´te´s and the The´aˆtre-Napole´on.30 In turn, and in
a move signalling rejection of an outmoded age of public accountability, the town
put the Grand-The´aˆtre’s management up for auction to the highest (sealed) bidder,
precisely in the manner of entertainment venues such as the bullﬁghting arenas in
the Midi.31
Yet it was the Marseille decision that was the most shocking, not least because
with a subsidy of 220,000 francs, it was on paper the most heavily council-
supported theatrical venture in regional France. A dispatch from the Marseille
correspondent for the Messager des the´aˆtres simply said – perhaps directed at Ruelle
himself – ‘it’s a measure I leave you to ponder’.32 At L’Art musical, ‘RALPH’
feared a domino effect: ‘It is to be presumed that other provincial town councils
will imitate that of Marseille’.33 His concern was not for disappointed local audi-
ences: it was for composers deprived of their royalties by the shrinking of the
opera market at the very moment when it was supposed to expand. (And if it
was Escudier writing, it was also doubtless to do with the prospect of lost revenue
for his publishing house, for which Verdi – much-loved in Marseille – was an
29 L’Art musical, 4/22 (28 April 1864), 169–71 at 170.
30 Juclier had a long and successful association with Bordeaux from 1848 to 1855, starting with his
establishment of a co-operative in the wake of the February revolution. But in the absence of
municipal subsidy the 1864 legislation was, for him as for Halanzier, a step too far. Arch. De´pt.
Seine-Maritime 4 T 93, folder Juclier.
31 The highest bidder withdrew at interview; the eventual winner of the contract was bankrupt
within weeks. Arch. De´pt. Seine-Maritime 4 T 94.
32 ‘c’est une mesure que je vous laisse appre´cier.’ Report from G. Duchemin, Le Messager des
the´aˆtres, 17/29 (14 April 1864).
33 ‘Il est a` pre´sumer que les municipalitie´s des autres villes de la province imiteront celle de
Marseille.’ L’Art musical (28 April 1864), 170.
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operatic money-spinner.) Quite apart from the imprecise wording of the legisla-
tion, its timing actively invited the feared ‘domino’ effect. The period December
to March was the traditional time for town councils to advertise for new managers
and to debate and revise their theatre contracts, subsidy levels included. Vaillant’s
announcement of November 1863 had given every council in the country the
opportunity to change its provision in time for the coming season. In the medium
term, as managers’ contracts came up for renewal, copies of municipal cahiers des
charges were swapped between towns as mayors and pre´fets wrote to each other,
asking ‘What do you do normally?’ and, more important, ‘What are you planning
to do now?’ In the coming years, all the major towns with resident theatre com-
panies would experience agonised municipal council discussions about different
forms of subsidy, or whether to award it at all. The pattern that emerged was
absolutely consistent: no subsidy, no grand opera company. Regional managers
could survive on ticket revenues if they put on plays, operetta, vaudeville and
fairytale spectaculars ( fe´eries). They could usually manage old-style ope´ra-comique.
But France’s ﬂagship genre was out of the question, as was bel canto opera, and
even the more expansive of recent ope´ras-comiques could pose difﬁculty.34
For town halls part of the ‘liberte´’ problem was that initial decisions made on
ﬁnances meant nothing as the theatrical season progressed. However generous
the agreed budget line for the new theatrical season, more likely than not managers
would be pleading for concessions by New Year, at which point councillors had a
gun to their heads not only because of public demand and the need to see public
investment rewarded by artistic success, but because the livelihoods of lowly
theatre workers for whom they had moral and/or legal responsibility depended
on the theatre remaining open.35 As Hemmings indicated for Paris: these latter
workers were the real casualties of deregulation because before 1864 their pay
was guaranteed either by the state/municipality or by the incoming manager in
the event of a bankruptcy cutting a season short.36 It is hardly surprising, then,
that where theatre ﬁnance was concerned, council meetings were protracted, that
the same arguments kept reappearing in new guises, and that councils occasionally
took a hard line from the outset. In 1865 one Marseille critic described subsidy, in
their brave new world of deregulation, as ‘a favour’;37 but Lille had, even before
1864, worked on the basis that a grand opera season was the exception not the
rule; its subsidy allocations were therefore only occasional.38 The more represen-
tative pre-1864 scenario, however, is provided by Toulouse, which during the July
34 For an attack on the way cultural pride caused secondary towns to take on ‘grands airs’ by
aspiring to present genres that were beyond their capacities, see Pierre-Franc¸ois-Adolphe
Carmouche, Le The´aˆtre en province (Paris, 1859), 20, 24. By contrast he recommended that theatre
directors be required to present spoken theatre (ibid., 33).
35 There was also the question of wasting considerable investment, which was the argument
Marseille councillors used when acceding to Husson’s request in May 1875 to receive advances
on his 1875–6 subsidy. Meeting of 27 May 1875, Arch. Mun. Marseille, 77 R 38.
36 Hemmings, Theatre and State, 174–5.
37 ‘une faveur.’ L. G. G. in La Publicite´, 10, no. 455 (9 November 1865), [1].
38 Letter of 11 December 1864 from mayor of Lille to mayor of Nantes. Arch. Mun. Nantes,
2 R 584, folder ‘Question the´aˆtrale, 1824–1932’.
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Monarchy was accustomed to a year-long lyric season but whose council had
seriously considered ending all subsidy on principle, and therefore all hope of
opera, as early as 1845. In a decision that took three meetings to reach and in
which they debated everything from municipal re´gie at one extreme to abandon-
ment of all ﬁnancial aid at the other, councillors ﬁnally decided instead to over-
turn their theatre committee’s recommendation, to double the 1845–6 subsidy of
25,000 for 1846–7, and to preserve their opera company.39
In 1864 itself the legislation’s effects were almost immediate, bringing the
Messager des the´aˆtres a steady stream of unwelcome news. Ruelle had not only
written in praise of liberalisation but had frequently, in the period between January
and March 1864, poured scorn on the fears of others. He fell silent on the subject
of ‘liberte´’ as news of spreading chaos emerged week by week, especially as the
new autumn season started up. Avignon had cut its subsidy and was trying to
import whatever opera it could on a temporary basis.40 Rouen was ‘cut off from
good music’ at the The´aˆtre des Arts until the council reconsidered its decision.41
From Dijon, correspondent Nicholas Fe´tu was disillusioned at the results of the
council’s lowering the subsidy by 5,000 francs, writing ‘Here, as doubtless else-
where, theatre deregulation has simply signalled backwards movement’.42 Toulon’s
correspondent, B. Pietra, captured the sense of desperation brought by uncertainty
and planning blight: ‘As you know, my dear director, this year we nearly had no
opera, and nearly no theatre, even; the subsidy was ﬁrst abolished, then restored,
then abolished again, then restored permanently. Oh, the fragility of council
affairs!’43
The towns mentioned above would have counted as ‘secondary’ within France.
Among most of the metropolitan centres – Lyon, Bordeaux, Toulouse, Rouen,
Lille and (at a pinch) Nantes – the situation was a little more stable. In 1864
Lyon’s manager Raphae¨l Fe´lix was mid-contract and the council did nothing
immediately (although Fe´lix, in common with so many of his colleagues, began
a campaign of special pleading for enhanced terms). Lille retained its subsidy.
Toulouse likewise, but the debate was fractious, with some support for a subsidy-
39 Arch. Mun. Toulouse 2 R 173. By 1847 the lyric season had been reduced to nine months;
ﬁnancial exigency in 1848 reduced the subsidy back to 25,000 francs, with no genre beyond
vaudeville contractually required. Ibid.
40 Report from J. Dumas, Le Messager des the´aˆtres, 17/82 (20 October 1864), [3].
41 ‘sevre´ de bonne musique.’ Report from Ame´de´e Gaucher, Le Messager des the´aˆtres, 17/84: 27
October 1864, [2]. As discussed below, the Rouen situation was complicated because although
the subsidy of 60,000 francs was not initially withdrawn, it proved insufﬁcient for intending
managers, and the council ended up letting the theatre without subsidy, and therefore without
including opera in the contract. The following week Gaucher reported that even the tiny
operetta company at the theatre had failed (Le Messager des the´aˆtres, 17/87 (6 November 1864).
42 ‘La liberte´ des the´aˆtres n’a e´te´ ici, comme ailleurs sans doute, que le signal d’un mouvement
re´trograde.’ Le Messager des the´aˆtres, 17/92 (24 November 1864).
43 ‘Vous le savez bien, mon cher directeur, nous avons failli, cette anne´e, ne pas avoir d’ope´ra,
et partant ne pas avoir de the´aˆtre; la subvention a e´te´ d’abord supprime´e, puis re´tablie, puis
supprime´e encore, puis re´tablie de´ﬁnitivement. Oh! fragilite´ des choses municipales!’ Le Messager
des the´aˆtres, 17/84 (Th 27 October 1864).
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free period of experimentation.44 Nantes heard and rejected an impassioned plea
for a return to re´gie from councillor J.-B. Guilley, but also voted for the status
quo.45 While such decisions to maintain subsidy levels might seem to bode well,
they did not, for the simple reason that the end to privilege had brought with it an
end to a manager’s rights to tax artistic competitors via the traditional percentage
cut of their ticket revenues. To the combination of subsidy and cross-subsidy
there entered, then, a third form of necessary or at least desirable support: cash
compensation to bridge the gap.46 Only Bordeaux, it seems, responded decisively
to such an idea, estimating at 24–25,000 francs the loss that its next manager
would suffer as a result of being unable to top-slice rival entertainments, and rais-
ing its subsidy accordingly.47 Its council debated its theatre contract early, on 18
January, at which point Marseille had not made its shocking decision. To the
delight of the pre´fet of the Gironde, the newly elected and opera-loving mayor
G. Henry Brochon persuaded colleagues that the decision other towns had before
them was whether to maintain or to raise their subsidy level, and that ‘no one is
dreaming of reducing it’.48 The atmosphere at Marseille a month or so later was
very different, and the ‘liberte´’ question was turned on its head as councillors – in
contrast to those in Bordeaux – began to think the unthinkable.
Marseille I: crisis
A word on Marseille’s particular character is in order here, for although it was
France’s second operatic city in the mid-1860s, the foundations of its operatic
prestige were shakier than those of either Lyon or Bordeaux. Its status rested on
two things: it invariably topped the league tables of municipal subsidy, and its
theatres were being run by the bullish and seemingly invincible Olivier Halanzier,
the most capable regional theatre manager in the country. In the short term, neither
of these aspects of its reputation would survive the ‘liberte´’. Though comparable
44 Toulouse council meeting of 15 February 1864. Arch. Mun. Toulouse, 1 D 61, f. 15r–16r.
The council did not raise the subsidy, but retained the principle of a single manager for both its
theatres, explicitly so as to enable cross-subsidy between them (ibid ).
45 On Guilley’s recommendation, Nantes had tried re´gie, at unacceptable cost, in 1857–61. See
E´tienne Destranges, Le The´aˆtre a` Nantes depuis ses origines jusqu’a` nos jours, 1430?–1893 (Paris,
1893), 317–31. (The question mark of the title was removed for the second edition of 1902,
which extended the narrative to 1901.) The question resurfaced in December 1863, with
straight subsidy voted after the decree became law (mayor to pre´fet, 16 February 1864). Arch.
De´pt. Loire-Atlantique, 177 T 8.
46 This was precisely Fe´lix Raphae¨l’s complaint, although his 1 February 1864 estimate of a loss of
60,000 francs in tax revenues is probably an exaggeration. Like Halanzier, in the wake of the
decree Fe´lix considered resigning on grounds of ‘force majeure’. Arch. Mun. Lyon 88 WP 006,
folder 20. In Toulouse, the ‘tax’ shortfall was noted as an unwelcome consequence of the
decree that would likely mean that the subsidy had to be increased. Council meeting of
15 February 1864. Arch. Mun. Toulouse, 1 D 61, f. 15r–16r.
47 By contrast, the Strasbourg council decided that the more serious threat (and it was indeed
a threat) was the recent hike in royalty levels demanded by the Socie´te´ des Auteurs et
Compositeurs Dramatiques. Mayor of Strasbourg to mayor of Nantes, 15 January [1866],
Arch. Mun. Strasbourg 180 MW 35.
48 ‘personne ne songe a` le re´duire.’ Bordeaux town council minutes, 18 January 1864. Arch. Mun.
Bordeaux 12 D 47, f. 76v.
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to Bordeaux in many ways, Marseille lacked the operatic pride that came as much
from the architecture of Bordeaux’s incomparable eighteenth-century theatre build-
ing as from its musical tradition. And unlike Lyon which had the huge Ce´lestins
theatre as well as the Grand-The´aˆtre, Marseille had only one building large enough
to mount the most prestigious operas. Moreover (and this was unusual in France),
the council did not even own the Grand-Theaˆtre building. In addition, council
decision-making was volatile, with debate on anything from schools to cemeteries
routinely more explosive than in either Lyon or Bordeaux. As Halanzier well knew,
at budget-setting time nothing was ever guaranteed.
Having seen the theatres bill as submitted to the Conseil d’E´tat, Halanzier sub-
mitted a pre-emptive resignation (pointedly, effective 1 July 1864) as early as 18
November 1863. Once it was made law he restated his intention and argued that
his position as the licensed manager of Marseille’s theatres had been rendered
null and void by ‘force majeure’.49 He would have had in mind Article 7 of the
legislation, which stated that ‘Current theatre managers, apart from those of the
subsidised theatres [meaning the state theatres], are and remain released from
all the clauses and conditions of their contracts with the Administration, to the
extent that they are contrary to the present decree.’50 On 4 March the town council
debated the legality of his resignation in light of that very Article, and discussed the
question of subsidy. It decided, against the wishes of the mayor (whose predictions
of artistic doom had in any case been cast aside by the consultative committee), that
the spirit of the 6 January decree was to let market forces dictate the theatre in-
dustry. Accepting Halanzier’s resignation, it decided to withdraw all subsidy to its
theatres beyond payment of the rent for the Grand-The´aˆtre, the Salle Beauvau,
which was not council property. The incoming mayor Bernex, who made the clos-
ing substantive contribution, summed up the cumulative logic of the meeting:
The dominant thinking in the decree of 6 January . . . is that of freedom and release. By
contrast, a subsidy, whatever its form and rationale might be, would clearly be in opposi-
tion to this generous thinking. Let us accept the position we have been given, without for
the moment worrying about the consequences which it might have; let’s not go looking
for problems and difﬁculties from which the decree is intended to release us. When the
government wants to offer freedoms and liberties to its towns, let us, its representatives
[i.e. of the town], welcome them gratefully, and let’s be careful, in applying them, not to
diminish their salutary effects.51
49 Letters of 14 and 26 January; 16 February 1864, cited and discussed in Marseille town council
minutes of 4 March 1864 (copy in Arch. Mun. Marseille 77 R 35). This account gives the lie
to Combarnous’s narrative of Halanzier’s resigning because the council cut his subsidy
(Combarnous, L’Histoire du Grand-The´aˆtre de Marseille, 31 octobre 1787 – 13 novembre 1919 [1927]
(Marseille, 1980), 105). He was not a victim: resigning so early, and successfully citing ‘force
majeure’, meant not only that he could retain 100 per cent of his security deposit but also that
he was maximally ﬂexible whatever the council decided.
50 ‘Les directeurs actuels des the´aˆtres, autres que les the´aˆtres subventionne´s, sont et demeurent
affranchis envers l’Administration de toutes les clauses et conditions de leurs cahiers des
charges, en tant qu’elles sont contraires a` ce de´cret.’ Law of 6 January 1864, Article 7.
51 ‘La pense´e dominante du de´cret du 6 janvier . . . est une pense´e de liberte´ et d’affranchissement.
Or, une subvention, quelles que seraient la forme et le motif, serait e´videmment en opposition
footnote continued on next page
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Tellingly, the Secretary General of the Bouches du Rhoˆne, acting on behalf of the
se´nateur (pre´fet), approved the decision relating to Halanzier but not that relating
to the subsidy cut – although the latter went ahead anyway.52
Marseille was journalistically well prepared for the council’s decision. The main
Republican daily, the Se´maphore, was consistently blunt, for Gustave Be´ne´dit,
who was one of the most ardent supporters of deregulation as a test of market
equilibrium, was also its regular music critic. Within his music column Be´ne´dit
had spent much of 1863 and the early part of 1864 diagnosing the ills of the
privilege system, collating and critiquing the writings of other interested parties
in Nantes, Lyon and Rouen, and laying much of the blame for regional decadence
on greedy tenors whose salaries absorbed inordinate amounts of subsidy and who
needed cutting down to size. Remove the subsidy, he wrote, and the market will
regulate the problem.53 To an extent he even predicted – with equanimity – the
likely outcome, although he thought it would be only temporary. Marseille’s grand
opera tradition would be halted:
Accordingly what is needed is for the artists of the principal opera houses, young and
intelligent men who, after all, have wits and good sense, to judge the situation for them-
selves and to contribute together to its prompt regularisation through a few sacriﬁces.
What would they say, for example, if (and it will happen) provincial towns, forced to
spend their tax income on urgent works, could no longer support opera?54
To members of a council in a port with commerce at its core, this kind of argu-
ment made sense. Writing anonymously in 1863 to press for full deregulation in
response to the Walewski consultation, Marius Roux – councillor, future collabo-
rator with Zola on Les Myste`res de Marseille, and critic of opera’s parasitic hold over
spoken theatre – looked forward to a system in which ‘the manager’s role would
avec cette ge´ne´reuse pense´e. Acceptons la position qui nous est faite, sans nous pre´occuper,
pour le moment, des conse´quences qu’elle pourra avoir; n’allons pas a` la recherche d’embarras
et de difﬁculte´s dont le de´cret a voulu nous affranchir. Quand le Gouvernement veut bien
accorder aux villes des franchises et des liberte´s, sachons, nous, ses repre´sentants, les accueillir
avec reconnaissance, et gardons-nous bien, dans leur application, d’en amoindrir les salutaires
effets.’ Marseille town council minutes of 4 March 1864 (copy in Arch. Mun. Marseille 77 R 35).
52 Marseille town council minutes, 4 March 1864. Secre´taire ge´ne´ral Fanjoux’s annotation of
23 March reads: ‘Vu et approuve´s, mais seulement en ce qui concerne la de´mission de
M. Halanzier.’
53 Be´ne´dit was not against opera per se, or in dispute with the then director of Marseille’s theatres.
Indeed, he dedicated his pamphlet Quelques re´ﬂexions relativement a` la liberte´ des the´aˆtres en province
(Marseille, 1864) to Halanzier as an ‘affectionate souvenir’. His view that the abolition of
subsidy would slow the rise in singer salaries was one shared by the Strasbourg council, which
hoped to beneﬁt indirectly from the consequences of other councils’ decisions to abolish.
Strasbourg raised its subsidy from 58,000 francs to 68,000 francs, but with the extra funds
targeted at skilled staff among the permanent workforce at the Grand-The´aˆtre. Council minutes
20 May 1864. Arch. De´pt. Bas-Rhin, TP 7/2.
54 ‘Il faut donc que les artistes des principaux the´aˆtres lyriques, jeunes hommes d’intelligence et
qui, apre`s tout, ont de l’esprit et du sens, jugent bien la situation et contribuent ensemble a` la
re´gulariser le plus promptement au moyen de quelques sacriﬁces. Que diraient-ils, par exemple,
si les villes de province (et la chose arrivera), force´es de consacrer les deniers des contribuables
[aux] travaux urgents, ne pouvaient plus de´sormais soutenir le genre lyrique?’ Gustave Be´ne´dit,
Se´maphore de Marseille, 37, no. 11,034 (3 February 1864), 1–2, at 2.
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be restricted . . . to the pure and simple presentation of what we shall allow our-
selves to refer to as their merchandise’.55 The moral: because opera is business, not
art, market failure is an invitation to replace it with something more saleable.
Without sharing the foreboding of those who saw the Italian system imploding
following uniﬁcation, Be´ne´dit looked to Florence for a model and inferred that a
major cause for the French crisis was nothing other than public apathy. A letter
of 2 June 1864 to the mayor of Lyon explained that he had always been against
subsidy because if a small Tuscan town with barely 60,000 inhabitants could
sustain a dozen unsubsidised opera houses he did not see why Marseille could
not succeed proportionately if it was what its inhabitants truly desired.56
Adaptive behaviour
Traditional modes of regional organisation ensured that the disruption brought
about by the 1864 deregulation extended beyond subsidy. The new encourage-
ment for competition within a single town meant that one of grand opera’s sup-
porting props – cross-subsidy from a second theatre specialising in drama and
vaudeville – was removed.57 Under the licensing system a single manager in a
two-theatre town could use the proﬁts from plays at one venue to cross-subsidise
opera at the other. Separating two theatres in order to break up a monopoly simply
increased the chances that the opera house manager would run into ﬁnancial
difﬁculty, or that no aspiring manager would risk putting together an opera com-
pany. In February 1864, Rouen council, which owned none of the town’s theatre
buildings, suffered a setback similar to that at Le Havre. It found that the sec-
ondary buildings had been let for the coming season, but that even with its
customary subsidy the jewel in the crown, the The´aˆtre des Arts, had no takers:
without the element of cross-subsidy in addition to previous subsidy levels, no
manager would touch the opera house deal.58 Another supporter of deregulation,
editor of L’Univers musical Louis Roger, reported on the Rouen council’s embarrass-
ment; but he had no answer to a conundrum on which the free market had silently
55 ‘Le roˆle des directeurs se bornerait . . . a` la pre´sentation pure et simple de ce que nous
permettrons d’appeler leur marchandise.’ (Original italics) Un ancien amateur, Marseille. Notice
historique sur ses the´aˆtres privile´gie´s (Marseille, 1863), 128.
56 Arch. Mun. Lyon, 88 WP 006, folder 20.
57 That said, where other kinds of props were concerned the dependency could work in reverse,
with the legislation leaving a supposedly independent secondary theatre without any call on the
scenery it had routinely borrowed from its mother opera house. The Varie´te´s at Toulouse was a
case in point, as explained by the mayor to the council in a speech arguing for the retention of
the status quo – including the running of the two theatres together. Given in L’Univers musical,
12/7 (18 February 1864), 50–2, at 51–2.
58 The need for such cross-subsidy was explicitly referred to in correspondence between the
mayors of Rouen and Nantes in which the mayor of Rouen lamented the ecological destruction
wrought by the legislation, especially in relation to opera. Letters of 21 March and 13 December
1864; the repeat of the problem of a vacant The´aˆtre des Arts in 1866 is reported in a letter of
12 January. Arch. Mun. Nantes, 2 R 584, folder ‘Question the´aˆtrale, 1824–1932’.
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pronounced, noting with a humility unusual among journalists: ‘For my part I
must say I have no idea how one can get out of this hole. It requires thought.’59
Such problems encouraged two divergent forms of adaptive behaviour. The
ﬁrst saw entrepreneurs running for municipal cover, taking refuge in pro-rata
salary systems in which expenditure would by deﬁnition never exceed revenue,
or shifting ﬁnancial responsibility elsewhere. Strasbourg’s councillors, for instance,
received seven applications to run its main theatre in 1864–5, among which were
two requests for municipal re´gie (not a good sign among supposed entrepreneurs)
and one for an artists’ co-operative (signalling a fundamental lack of ﬁnancial conﬁ-
dence).60 The following year the new manager – who had agreed to run the theatre
on the standard model of the ‘ﬁnancially liable manager’ (directeur responsible) –
asked the council to take over the salaries of the chorus, thereby transforming
them into municipal employees.61 At the other extreme, managers engaged in collu-
sive practices aimed at effecting a return to something approaching older monopolies.
There was nothing in the legislation, beyond an appeal to the spirit of competi-
tion and encouragement to break from past practices, to prohibit the monopolistic
running of theatres; but the ambiguity signalled another ﬂaw in the legislation’s
design, and councils anxious to ensure that they were not indirectly subsidising
entertainment rather than art tended to support generic separation as per Paris,
with one manager per theatre. In Lille during an exceptional season (1867–8), the
council authorised two partner managers, Briet and Bertrand, to run the The´aˆtre
de Lille and the The´aˆtre des Varie´te´s in tandem. Their subsidy – a considerable
66,000 francs which rose to 80,000 once beneﬁts in kind were added – raised
expectations, which they amply fulﬁlled with reprises of L’Africaine, Les Huguenots,
Les Martyrs and Norma and new productions of Mignon and Rome´o et Juliette,
together with Offenbach’s La Grande-duchesse and Jean qui pleure. They put on forty
operas and eighty-three dramatic works during the season, reaping healthy proﬁts.
The following year, however, the council decided to separate the two businesses
while maintaining the operatic subsidy. Briet was to stay at the The´aˆtre de Lille;
Bertrand was to run the Varie´te´s alone, without subsidy. Nevertheless, the two
men decided to continue as before. As related with sang-froid by the local his-
torian Le´on Lefebvre in 1903, the results mixed the farcical with the artistically
catastrophic:
In effect, a single company serviced both the Varie´te´s and the Grand-The´aˆtre, where the
artists often performed on the same night. Carriages transported them from the one to
the other – but not always in time, which caused interruptions and delays about which
there were frequent protests.62
59 ‘J’avoue, pour mon compte, que je ne sais pas trop par quel moyen on pourra sortir de ce
mauvais pas. Cela demande re´ﬂexion.’ L’Univers musical, 12/7 (18 February 1864), 50–2, at 51.
60 Arch. De´pt. Bas-Rhin TP 7/2: copy of municipal council minutes for 20 May 1864.
61 Request of 21 January 1865 from Amable Boı¨ge Mute´e to extend his contract, Arch. De´pt
Bas-Rhin, TP 7/1. He also asked for the opera season to be reduced from eight months to
seven on the same subsidy.
62 ‘En effet, une seule troupe desservait simultane´ment les Varie´te´s et le Grand-The´aˆtre, ou`
les artistes jouaient souvent le meˆme soir; des voitures les y transportaient vice-versa, mais pas
footnote continued on next page
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What happened in Lille in 1868–9 was not an isolated occurrence, and it reﬂected
the very same recognition of the need for subsidy and cross-subsidy that had
caused such embarrassment in Rouen in the wake of the legislation’s promulga-
tion. In preparation for his second managership in Lyon, in 1869, Halanzier nego-
tiated council and prefectorial approval for a similar arrangement, bidding to run
the Grand-The´aˆtre and the much larger Ce´lestins together, with an associate.63
The only other system that seemed to offer any hope – touted by Bordeaux as a
sign of success because it had enabled it to run for twelve years without a mana-
gerial bankruptcy – was the traditional ‘emergency measure’ of a performers’ co-
operative working on pro-rata wages.64
Amid such evidence of scrabbling to stay aﬂoat, the broader irony here is that
the story of the ‘liberte´ des the´aˆtres’ is more complex than one of brute Parisian
blindness to regional difference, just as it is more complex than the Biarritz mayor’s
tale of theatre managers whose privileges worked contrary to the good of society.
Walewski’s consultation process of 1862 was thorough, its questions taking nothing
for granted save that the regions needed a cure and that both diagnosis and pre-
scription were best provided by those who inhabited them. But the legislation’s
move from Walewski’s ofﬁce to that of Vaillant, and its progress towards Napole´on
III’s stated aim of free competition, signalled a move away from regional sensitivity
and towards a vision centred much more closely on the shape of theatrical provi-
sion in the capital. In the process, Vaillant seems to have misjudged several things.
In his zeal to improve the dissemination of classical plays he underestimated the
importance of opera, and therefore made inadequate provision for sustaining it
within a new theatrical order. He underestimated the power of municipal free-
marketeers who sought to stop local opera productions from haemorrhaging public
money by stopping opera production altogether. And ﬁnally, he assumed that under
deregulation public taste would remain wedded to traditional modes of educational
entertainment rather than migrating to operetta, to the cafe´-concert, and to other
forms of musical spectacular. A closing return to the story of Marseille, the cata-
lyst for the capital’s shocked re-evaluation of deregulation, graphically illustrates
the impact of these interlocking phenomena.
Marseille II: the ‘experiment’
With Halanzier gone, the musical content of the 1864–5 season at the Grand-
The´aˆtre under a new manager was dominated by sixty consecutive performances
of Peau d’aˆne, a Perrault-based fe´erie in which lavish scenery and costumes dazzled
capacity audiences. Neither of the two main papers – the Se´maphore de Marseille and
toujours en temps voulu, ce qui amenait des interruptions et des longueurs contre lesquelles
on manifesta fre´quemment.’ Le´on Lefebvre, Histoire du The´aˆtre de Lille de ses origines a` nos jours,
5 vols. (Lille, 1901–7), IV (Lille, 1903), 223.
63 Louis Charles Alfred Mangeis, dit d’Herblay, was Lyon’s sole Directeur des the´aˆtres from 1866,
contracting a proﬁt-share with Halanzier to start in 1870. Arch. Mun. Lyon, 88 WP 006, folder
23.
64 A. S., La Question du Grand-The´aˆtre a` Bordeaux (Bordeaux, 1886), 5.
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La Publicite´ – condemned the subsidy cut or its immediate consequences. There
was a tone of regret in the latter; but no outrage.65 The town was conducting an
experiment with the new legislation, and it had to be given time to reach its con-
clusion. In fact, Marseille did not go entirely opera-less during 1864–5, but opera
came at a high aesthetic and reputational price. Visiting companies played at both
the city’s theatres – from Italy, doing a few weeks of Italian opera in January and
April, and from Toulon at the Grand-The´aˆtre, doing Guillaume Tell, Hale´vy’s Les
Mousquetaires de la reine and La Juive, and Boieldieu’s La Dame blanche. The Toulon
company gave two performances of the Rossini, and the other operas each for
one night only.66 Accordingly, a city renowned for its French grand opera enjoyed
just three nights of it during the entire season, borrowing it from a second-tier
company along the coast. In Marseille, despite high ticket prices (or perhaps
because of them), neither Italian visit broke even. Be´ne´dit was disappointed, but
took the opportunity to lecture his readers on the fact that expensive singers had
to be paid for – by someone – and it seemed fair enough to expect audiences to
bear the brunt.67 Even he, though, seems to have acknowledged by the summer
of 1865 that the experiment had yielded unintended and unacceptable results: in
particular, deregulation was now affecting spoken theatre adversely, with ribaldry
replacing delicacy and good taste.68 The municipal council, temporarily chastened
by the year’s events, voted in its highest subsidy to date (250,000 francs) for
1865–6, and restored both the ‘de´buts’ system and price-capping. As the mayor
of Marseille wrote to his opposite number in Nantes in 1866, ‘A year’s experiment
has been proven sufﬁcient.’69 Be´ne´dit went silent, even omitting to report on the
opening of the new theatre season. Meanwhile, Halanzier returned in triumph
having made his point via his own brand of silence, and grand opera came back
as though nothing had happened.70
Yet a mere two years later similar destabilisation occurred, and with consequences
that illustrated the increasingly powerful presence of operetta and the cafe´-concert
at opera’s expense.71 Marseille was not alone here: the impact of deregulation on
the relationship between opera and its entertainment-sector cousins was swift
in France’s other major urban centres – principally Lille, Lyon and Bordeaux –
65 The most Ad[olphe] Royannez expressed was disappointment that musically the new company
would be limited to doing operetta, or the simplest ope´ra-comique. La Publicite´, 9, no. 402
(1 September 1864), [1].
66 Combarnous, L’Histoire, 106.
67 Se´maphore de Marseille, 37, no. 11,306 (23 December 1864), [1]. Combarnous’s account of these
visits is more sanguine (L’histoire, 106); but it should be noted that he hides a great deal in his
account of the mid-1860s.
68 Se´maphore de Marseille, 38, no. 11,503 (17 August 1865), [1].
69 ‘Cette expe´rience d’une anne´e a e´te´ juge´e sufﬁsante.’ Letter of 17 January 1866. Arch. Mun.
Nantes, 2 R 584, folder ‘Question the´aˆtrale, 1824–1932’.
70 Combarnous glosses over this episode as a mere ‘interregnum’, which is not how it appeared in
Marseille at the time. Combarnous, L’Histoire du Grand-The´aˆtre, 105–7.
71 As early as 20 February 1864 the pre´fet of the Bouches-du-Rhoˆne complained to the mayor of
Marseille that he had been swamped with expressions of fear and foreboding relating to the new
legislation and its potential effect on the relationship between theatre and entertainment (Arch.
De´pt Bouches-du-Rhoˆne, 4 T 72, folder ‘Liberte´ the´aˆtrale’).
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which also had thriving cafe´-concerts in working-class areas. And while operetta
could, in the early years after deregulation, be neutralised from the point of view
of competition between theatres by being absorbed into the diet of a town’s
Grand-The´aˆtre, there were municipalities where artistic pride blocked such moves
(Rouen, for instance, banned it at the The´aˆtre des Arts until 1890).72 And with
the liberalisation of cafe´s-concerts themselves in 1867 the number of potential
venues for the operetta repertory expanded quickly.
Marseille’s opera crisis of 1867 saw Halanzier in the middle of the fray once
more. His contract having technically ﬁnished in May 1867, mayor Bernex tried
to lure him back for the 1867–8 season.73 But Halanzier’s attempt to put together
a company over the summer failed for want of a heroic tenor of high enough
quality, and after July, when he decided not to sign any contract with Marseille
after all, the council bargained so hard over subsidy with potential managers –
eventually cutting it entirely – that the Grand-The´aˆtre remained closed for the
ﬁrst ten weeks of the season.74 Marseille’s chaos was humiliating: opera lovers
would have to travel to Aix-en-Provence, reported one of the latter’s journalists
gleefully, to feed their habit.75 The fallout was reported week by week and from
multiple perspectives by the news-sheet La Publicite´. It was a picture of institu-
tional breakdown combined with solutions offering dangerously creative prece-
dents. The conductor was reduced to advertising private music lessons76 and the
orchestral musicians gave impromptu concerts.77 But, and with the blessing of the
pre´fet, the core members of the Grand-The´aˆtre company were offered work else-
where in the city: the corps de ballet (and the chorus) were to be found on stage
at the two largest cafe´s-concerts, the Alcazar and the Casino.78 This new ecology
broke down genre barriers that opera’s providers badly needed to be kept intact.
In short, it offered swift proof of the mobility of singers and dancers from high to
72 Not so Toulouse, where in 1872 the halting of Offenbach’s Orphe´e at the Varie´te´s (a singer
became ill mid-performance) saw audience members rushing to catch its conclusion at the
Grand-The´aˆtre, where it was playing the same night. Lucien Remplon, Gloire immortelle . . .
du Capitole: Histoire de l’art lyrique au The´aˆtre du Capitole de Toulouse, 1880–1995 (Toulouse, 2003),
32–3. The weakening of the Rouen council’s defences against operetta came with the argument
that some operettas had enough artistic merit to be considered ‘works in the nature of an
ope´ra-comique’ (pie`ces assimile´es a` l’ope´ra-comique). Predictably, semantic arguments ensued
over what counted and what did not – relating in particular to ope´ra-bouffe. Council meeting of
11 April 1890. Arch. Mun. Rouen, 2 R, folder ‘Campagne 1890–91’.
73 Bernex to Halanzier, 17 May 1867. Bibliothe`que Nationale de France, Ope´ra, Dossier d’artiste
Halanzier.
74 This narrative, supplied by a broadly supportive Be´ne´dit (Se´maphore de Marseille, 40, no. 12,135
(11 September 1867), [1]) ﬁlls in the ‘hole’ in Combarnous’s history whereby the 1867–8 season
simply starts, uncommented, in December. Combarnous, L’Histoire du Grand-The´aˆtre, 112.
75 Alphonse d’Este, La Publicite´ 12, no. 530 (24 October 1867), [2]. A long way down the operatic
hierarchy, Aix was the home base of the 18th arrondissement company, which had started doing
opera only in the early 1860s. Arch. De´pt. Bouches-du-Rhoˆne, 4 T 75 (The´aˆtre d’Aix, 1861–
1914).
76 Unsigned, La Publicite´, 12, no. 525 (12 September 1867), [2].
77 Karl Schmidt in La Publicite´, 12, 529 (17 October 1867), [1].
78 Exceptionally, these two cafe´s-concerts had been allowed to take around sixty employees from
the non-functioning Grand-The´aˆtre. H. Bondilh in La Publicite´, 12, no. 529 (17 October 1867).
Unintended consequences: Theatre deregulation and opera in France, 1864–1878 347
low theatrical genres, especially given that some of those who had moved to the
cafe´s-concerts stayed there once the Grand-The´aˆtre was ﬁnally in possession of a
manager, Husson, and had to be replaced.79 Mobility in this direction provided
one of the most disturbing lessons of deregulation: that musicians and dancers
on whom the French state and its municipal representatives had bestowed free
education could just as easily ﬁnd work in the entertainment sector as in that
of high art, thereby giving the state and its taxpayers nothing in return for its
investment. Such was, at least, the widely held view among regional ofﬁcials and
municipal theatre managers by the time of Age´nor Bardoux’s 1878 review of the
French theatre industry.80
However, among those with less to lose the same signs could be interpreted
differently. The hybridity of Marseille’s theatrical map in 1867 prompted H.
Bondilh, one of La Publicite´ ’s writers, to call for a permanent end to subsidy at
the Salle Beauvau on the basis that public support was an outdated and elitist phe-
nomenon. Instead, he argued, cafe´s-concerts should be allowed to become full
cafe´s-the´aˆtres doing operetta for the ‘real public’ – the working classes. Operetta
had proved its worth in similar circumstances at the Alcazar in Paris, he wrote; an
extension of the ofﬁcial liberality shown in the present crisis would allow the same
in Marseille, where the two main cafe´s-concerts were supplemented by around ten
smaller venues, each of which also stood to beneﬁt from such opening-up of the
theatre market.81 It is hardly surprising that he also reiterated a view increasingly
present in town council discussions across the country: that municipal taxes
should not be levied indiscriminately when they helped subsidise a luxury industry
in which poorer taxpayers had no interest and which they had too little spare cash
to enjoy.
The opposite view rested on an identical diagnosis: create an operatic vacuum
and operetta will ﬁll it. Whether that operetta was mounted at cafe´s-concerts or at
secondary theatres such as Marseille’s Gymnase was immaterial. In any case it
was hardly prophecy to utter such thoughts, since it simply described what was
happening in Marseille during the 1867 interregnum at the Beauvau. In a lead
editorial for La Publicite´, which presented both sides of the debate, the critic Karl
Schmidt launched an attack on the genre that had, over the previous several
weeks, swamped the town’s musical life. His conﬁdence bolstered by the belief
that the Grand-The´aˆtre managership had ﬁnally been settled, he wrote:
People are quite right to say that what is good for some always brings problems for others.
There will be people who will not cheer [at the news of opera’s return to the Grand-
The´aˆtre] – the good Mr Bellevaut, for example, who beneﬁted at the Gymnase from the
79 Karl Schmidt in La Publicite´, 12, no. 534 (21 November 1867), [1].
80 Within the reports pre´fets gathered in order to respond to Bardoux’s consultation document,
two themes dominate: laments about aspiring artists leaving their training early in order to make
easy money, and complaints about the growth of the cafe´-concert sector more generally.
81 ‘le vrai public’ – H. Bondilh in La Publicite´, 12, no. 529 (17 October 1867), feuilleton. The article
was pointedly entitled ‘L’Art pour le peuple’ (the Beauvau being for the dilettanti – although to
be fair its prices were organised to attract a wide spectrum of Marseillais).
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lack of opera and who saturated and even super-saturated his subscribers to his heart’s
content, with no competition, with Offenbach’s eternal orchestral skipping . . . Offenbach’s
music (if it is indeed music) was beginning to fatigue us and was insufﬁcient for an
audience not yet completely Ge´rolsteinised.82
The anticipated manager Albert Vizentini would return the singers, dancers and
musicians currently exiled to the Alcazar and the Casino, to their rightful place;
the Marseillais, claimed Schmidt, were metaphorically shouting ‘No more Offen-
bach!’83 Schmidt, as it happened, was mistaken twice over: Vizentini’s contract fell
through and it took until December to install Husson; and, as we have seen, not
all the musical ‘exiles’ wished to return.
The slippage in La Publicite´ between the satirical or risque´ chanson of the cafe´-
concert, and the genres of ope´ra-bouffe and operetta, is signiﬁcant: all were threats if
one believed in a musical hierarchy topped by opera, because all appealed more to
pleasure than to ediﬁcation, could attract larger audiences than opera, and could
also (as they did in Paris) tempt traditional opera-goers away from their once-
favoured haunts. Audience behaviour was changing, and while state intervention
served to maintain the operatic status quo in the capital, the refusal of central
government to support the regions ﬁnancially left them alone in uncharted waters.
The regions were always fragile, but it was deregulation that fatally unbalanced its
ecosystem, brought everything into question, and provided no answers beyond
those that individuals, or individual municipalities, carved out for themselves. At
a time when the chanson and the cafe´-concert were becoming ever more theatrical,
it exploded the idea that large-scale opera had universal appeal and that its civilising
force – as implied in the 1824 legislation that had seemingly presaged the rise
of grand opera – brought with it unquestionable rights to subsidy in the name of
the general populace. With such subsidy now a ‘favour’ at most, suddenly, rudely,
opera was brought face to face with market forces.
The lessons of 1864
If deregulation taught both Paris and the regions one thing, it was that it takes
a single breach of a dam to ﬂood an entire landscape. In the end, the Marseille
crises of 1864 and 1867 were not so much about the provision of subsidy to
keep grand opera healthy, as about its capacity to hold in check a vibrant commer-
cial sector ready to overwhelm it with related, and hugely popular, modes of en-
tertainment. The national experiment with deregulation took no time whatever to
demonstrate that a free market would lead in precisely the opposite direction from
82 ‘On a bien raison de dire que le bonheur des uns fait toujours le malheur des autres; il y aura
des gens qui ne jubileront pas; ce bon monsieur Bellevaut, par exemple, qui be´ne´ﬁciait au
Gymnase du manque d’ope´ra et qui saturait ses abonne´s a` loisir, sans concurrence et jusqu’a`
plus soif de l’e´ternel sautillement orchestre´ d’Offenbach, qu’on est convenu d’appeler musique
bouffe! . . . La musique d’Offenbach (si musique il y a) commenc¸ait a` nous lasser et ne pouvait
sufﬁre a` un public pas encore tout-a`-fait Ge´rolsteinise´.’ Karl Schmidt, La Publicite´, 12, no. 531
(31 October 1867), [1].
83 ‘ ‘‘Plus d’Offenbach!’’ tel est le cri ge´ne´ral.’ La Publicite´ (31 October 1887).
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that which Vaillant intended. And yet its failure on its own terms as a speciﬁcally
artistic and educational measure prompted no attempt at corrective government
intervention until 1878 – the other side of a lost war and amid a succession of
unstable national administrations. Moreover, that intervention – yet another
request for information from pre´fets, mayors and theatre managers – was never
acted upon, interrupted as it was by yet another change of government. Age´nor
Bardoux, whose ministerial portfolio combined education with the arts, regarded
the ‘liberte´’ as a national cultural disaster, and framed his supposedly disinterested
request for information with unprecedented frankness about theatrical ‘deca-
dence’ across the country. How, he asked, could the interests of art, of the public,
and of artists be best served? How could the lowering of standards in theatre, noted
by ‘lots of excellent minds’ and attributed to the 1864 decree, be reversed?84 In
Republican France the answer was not obvious: as the mayor of Bordeaux put
it, repeal of such a hard-won ‘liberte´’ was politically unthinkable, however ill-
conceived one might consider the original legislation.85 With a double-whammy
of theatrical ‘liberte´’ in 1864 and cafe´-concert liberalisation in 1867, in terms of
highbrow art the regions had been left to fend for themselves.
It is hardly surprising, then, that it should have been Bardoux’s consultation
document that prompted a wave of calls for a step-change in investment in
French theatre from both local and central government. The proposed solutions
coming from around France ranged widely but represented a concerted move
away from trust in the individual ﬁnancial responsibility of the entrepreneur.
They included municipal re´gie to cover permanent theatre workers such as chorus,
orchestra, corps de ballet and backstage staff, with a pro-rata system for princi-
pals;86 full municipal re´gie;87 closer policing of theatrical competition at ministerial,
rather than prefectorial, level;88 and, at the extreme, central government subsidy.
Where there were mixed messages, public money still loomed large as part of the
solution: a response from Toulouse which started by acclaiming deregulation in
principle nevertheless called for either re´gie for each town’s Grand-The´aˆtre (to
make each municipality function like a mini-Paris) or state funding (to assimilate
theatre to the status of the great French museums).89 Where new music was con-
cerned, the idea of state funding was seized upon most creatively by the theatre
commission at Lyon – which had already raised a decentralist ﬂag in July 1865
when it became the only regional theatre to secure the title ‘Imperial’. This time,
the commission, whose membership included the Wagnerian Henry Coutagne,
84 ‘[b]eaucoup d’excellents esprits.’ Consultation document sent in November 1878. Undated copy
in AN Paris, F21 1330, folder ‘Circulaires’.
85 Mayor of Bordeaux to pre´fet of the Gironde, 17 December 1898. Arch. De´pt. Gironde,
167 T 15, folder ‘Conse´quences du de´cret du 6 janvier 1864’.
86 Response from Nantes in Arch. Mun. Nantes 2 R 584, folder ‘Question the´aˆtrale, 1824–1932’.
87 Response from Director of Grand-The´aˆtre, Bordeaux, in Arch. De´pt. Gironde, 167 T 15, folder
‘Conse´quences du de´cret du 6 janvier 1864’.
88 Response from Director of The´aˆtre-Franc¸ais, Bordeaux, in Arch. De´pt. Gironde, 167 T 15,
folder ‘Conse´quences du de´cret du 6 janvier 1864’.
89 Response signed Th. Omer, 28 November 1878, in Arch. De´pt Haute-Garonne, 8 T 5, folder
‘1878–9 Enqueˆte sur les re´sultats de la loi du 6 j. 1864 sur la liberte´ des the´aˆtres’.
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decided at a meeting of 29 November 1878, in response to Bardoux’s consulta-
tion, that the failure of the new The´aˆtre-Lyrique in Paris was an opportunity for
the diversion of part of its subsidy to Lyon in return for the mounting of new
works at the Grand-The´aˆtre.90 It was an audacious call, but it worked, and it
brought them 20,000 francs to support the world premiere of Saint-Sae¨ns’s
Etienne Marcel in 1879. News of the grant spread quickly, with the sous-pre´fet
of Blaye knowing about it even before the ofﬁcial news was relayed to Lyon on
20 December.91 To a decentralist such as him it seemed like a sign of genuine
progress, and one of the few ways of counteracting the ‘scourge’ ( plaie) of the
cafe´-concert. In something approaching a turning of the tables, his response to
Bardoux’s consultation boiled down to the notion that since it was central govern-
ment that had made a chronic problem acute, it was the responsibility of central
government to bankroll the remedy. It was only a short step to the project
outlined to Bardoux the following year – the year he left ofﬁce – by a certain
L. Fabert, who advocated a special ‘Regional Theatres’ service run out of the
Ministry itself.92 It is of course somewhat ironic that calls for centralisation and
decentralisation alike should be predicated upon ﬁnancial backing from Paris.93
For all that it was never intended to bring about the full industrialisation of
theatre, deregulation wrenched operatic France into a commercial age from which
the war of 1870 and its economic aftermath ensured it would not be able to
return. Especially given the bankruptcies that followed the sudden expansion of
the theatre industry after the original 1791 deregulation, we might ask whether it
could ever have worked in opera’s favour; but in 1864 there was certainly too
much momentum behind operetta and the cafe´-concert for opera not to suffer
in comparison. Moreover the interpenetration of genres – with operetta routinely
presented on subsidised regional stages and, after 1867, in cafe´s-concerts too –
was a further blow. As for the Classical theatre that Vaillant had championed
so effusively at the Paris Conservatoire in 1864: regionally, it was left for dead.
Finally, the war of 1870 simply secured what 1864 had established, because for
all the rhetoric about turning away from frivolity, in straitened times during the
early Third Republic operetta thrived not just because it was popular, but because
it was cheap.
90 Minutes: Arch. Mun. Lyon, 88 WP 010 folder ‘Demande de participation au reliquat de la
subvention accorde´e en 1877 au The´aˆtre Lyrique’.
91 Sous-pre´fet of Blaye to pre´fet of the Gironde, 3 December 1878. Arch. De´pt. Gironde,
167 T 15, folder ‘Conse´quences du de´cret du 6 janvier 1864’.
92 L. Fabert, Me´moire sur la ne´cessite´ de rattacher au Ministe`re de l’Instruction Publique et des Beaux-Arts le
service des the´aˆtres des de´partements et sur la cre´ation, a` l’Administration des Beaux-Arts d’une Inspection et
d’un Bureau spe´ciaux a` ce service (unpublished, Paris, April 1879). AN F21 954.
93 Neither was the idea of central government funding new: it had been the cornerstone of
Antoine-Louis Malliot’s doomed petitions of the 1860s to the French Senate, rebuffed as
‘centralist’ by Baron Haussmann. See my ‘Funding Grand Opera’, 80–3. In addition, it is
notable that this shift of the 1870s is presaged by the highly ironic post-1864 ‘Stateism’
which Fe´ret detects within the arrondissement system, where municipalities that had never had
to supervise their theatre closely because itineraries were pre-set at De´partemental level, found
themselves suddenly taking ownership of and subsidising theatrical affairs, in ‘decentralised’
fashion because there was no one else to do it. See Fe´ret, ‘Le de´cret’, 59–60.
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Yet if operetta and the double-entendre of the cafe´-concert chanson were generic
threats in terms of ticket sales and municipal artistic pride, they were, in ﬁnancial
terms, only the most visible part of a complex problem many aspects of which
either lay beyond municipal and entrepreneurial control, or involved hidden costs
some of which municipalities resented having thrust upon them by central gov-
ernment in the name of ‘freedom’. Ironically, the newly optional ‘artistic’ subsidy
lay at the heart of such costs: but the minimum level at which it could reasonably
be set had to take into account shifting inter-relationships between a manager’s
taxation and cross-subsidy rights, his liabilities in respect of the Poor Tax and
author royalties, an ever-shortening operatic season leaving ‘municipal’ theatre
workers unoccupied but still requiring payment, and the need to ensure that the
theatre was widely accessible across social classes, that recruited artists were
acceptable to the public, and that repertory underwent regular renewal.94 There
is no hint in the legislation or the documents accompanying it that mare´chal
Vaillant took account of any of these concerns in 1863. Those which were unique
to the ecology of the regions seem to have escaped his Parisian mindset entirely.
Among short-term consequences we can cite endemic destabilisation allowing
entertainment genres to break through barriers that were supposed to keep them
at bay; among medium-term consequences we can point to enduring weakness in
the regions’ capacity to effect a much-desired artistic decentralisation towards the
end of the century in several major cities – among them notably Rouen (the ﬁrst
ofﬁcially ‘national’ regional theatre since Lyon in 1865) and Lyon itself (often
dubbed the ‘French Bayreuth’).95 While the national theatres could expect a
measure of continuity, metropolitan France knew only uncertainty and perennial
change. And while neither subsidies nor grand opera disappeared for good in the
wake of 1864, the consequences of deregulation rendered France’s most presti-
gious musical genre vulnerable as never before.
94 The consolidation during the later nineteenth century of a ‘guest star system’ among singers did
nothing to curtail salary levels; when publishers began hiring rather than selling the orchestral
parts to old and new music alike, ﬁnancial pressures would worsen still further.
95 On Rouen, see Clair Rowden, ‘Decentralisation and Regeneration at the The´aˆtre des Arts,
Rouen, 1889–1891’, Revue de musicologie, 94 (2008), 139–80.
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